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Abstract	
The	move	towards	prevention	in	domestic	anti‐terror	law	and	policy	was	initially	justified	as	
an	 exceptional	 response	 to	 the	 exceptional	 threat	 of	 transnational	 terrorism	 following	
September	 11,	 2001.	 However,	 commonalities	 are	 discernable	 between	 prevention	 in	 anti‐
terror	 law	 and	 prevention	 as	 employed	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 Australian	 law.	 To	 begin	
contextualising	and	analysing	preventive	practices	in	Australia,	a	framework	is	required.	‘The	
preventive	state’	provides	one	way	to	view	the	collection	of	preventive	measures	employed	in	
Australia.	 Engaging	 a	 governmentality	 perspective	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 make	 visible	
prevention	 and	 pre‐emption	 in	 law	 and	 governance,	 and	 to	 inform	 critical	 treatment	 of	 the	
preventive	state	itself.	Whether	and	how	prevention	and	pre‐emption	in	anti‐terror	law	differ	
from	 and	 exhibit	 continuities	 with	 other	 preventive	 measures	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 expose	
issues	of	selectivity	and	proportionality	between	preventive	measures	and	force	consideration	
of	the	limits	of	state	action	to	prevent	or	pre‐empt	harm.	
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Introduction	
In	the	wake	of	September	11,	2001,	the	Australian	government	embraced	a	domestic	anti‐terror	
policy	that	prioritised	the	prevention	of	terrorism	(Department	of	Prime	Minister	and	Cabinet,	
2006,	2010;	Ruddock,	2007).	Then	Attorney	General	Phillip	Ruddock	championed	prevention	as	
a	 cornerstone	 of	 Australia’s	 counter	 terrorism	 policy,	 by	 which	 the	 government	 sought	 to	
‘prevent	 rather	 than	to	react	 to	 terrorist	offences’	 (Ruddock,	2007:	4).	The	policy	objective	of	
prevention	 permeates	 much	 of	 Australia’s	 anti‐terror	 legislation,	 with	 54	 anti‐terror	 laws	
enacted	 by	 the	 Commonwealth	 Parliament	 in	 the	 decade	 following	 September	 11	 (Williams,	
2011:	1144).	Many	of	these	laws	are	geared	towards	detection	and	early	intervention	to	thwart	
a	terrorist	threat.	
	
Prevention	in	Australia’s	domestic	legal	response	to	terror	has	ushered	in	a	host	of	‘pre‐crime’	
measures	 that	 permit	 the	 state	 to	 intervene	 and	 restrain	 an	 individual	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	
anticipated	 future	 harm,	 rather	 than	 past	 wrongdoing	 (Zedner,	 2007a:	 259).	 Prevention	 by	
liberty	 restraint	 is	 a	 feature	 of	many	 anti‐terror	 initiatives,	 most	 notably	 control	 orders	 and	
preparatory	 offences	 (Divs	 101,	 104,	 Criminal	 Code	 Act	 1995	 (Cth)	 ‘Criminal	 Code’).	 These	
measures	deviate	from	the	traditional	retrospective	and	‘post‐crime’	orientation	of	the	criminal	
justice	 system,	 where	 the	 state	 reacts	 and	 responds	 to	 harm	 by	 prosecuting	 and	 punishing	
criminal	acts	on	the	basis	of	evidence	gathered	about	past	events	(Roach,	2010;	Zedner,	2007a:	
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259,	 2009:	 73).	 ‘Pre‐crime’	 measures	 are	 predictive	 and	 rely	 upon	 intelligence	 ‘about	 future	
threats	 to	 security’	 gathered	 through	 surveillance	 practices	 and	 ‘pre‐crime’	 policing	 (Roach,	
2010:	52;	Walker,	2011:	56).		
	
Australia’s	anti‐terror	laws	were	originally	justified	as	exceptional	measures	in	response	to	the	
exceptional	threat	of	transnational	terrorism	following	September	11	(McGarrity	and	Williams,	
2010).	Legislation	aimed	at	preventing	future	harm	by	restricting	an	individual’s	liberty	in	the	
present	 is,	 however,	 neither	 new	 nor	 novel	 to	 the	 Australian	 legal	 system.	 Apprehended	
violence	 orders	 and	binding	over	orders	 are	 examples	of	where	parliaments	have	 sanctioned	
restrictions	upon	an	individual’s	liberty	in	order	to	avert	harm.	Prevention	by	liberty	restriction	
is	 also	 a	 feature	 of	 post‐sentence	 preventive	 detention	 and	 extended	 supervision	 orders	 in	
respect	 to	serious	sex	offenders,	such	as	are	available	 in	NSW	pursuant	to	the	Crimes	(Serious	
Sex	Offenders)	Act	2006	(NSW).		
	
This	raises	the	question	of	whether	prevention	in	anti‐terror	law	is	distinct	from	prevention	in	
other	 areas	 of	 Australian	 law,	 and	 what	 we	 might	 learn	 from	 examining	 continuities	 and	
discontinuities	between	preventive	measures.	In	order	to	answer	this	question	a	framework	is	
required	 to	 begin	 contextualising	 and	 analysing	 preventive	 practices	 in	 Australia.	 This	 paper	
argues	 that	 ‘the	 preventive	 state’	 provides	 a	 useful	 conceptual	 framework	 through	 which	 to	
view	the	collection	of	preventive	measures	in	Australian	law.	In	order	to	subject	preventive	law	
and	 governance	 as	 well	 as	 the	 preventive	 state	 itself	 to	 critical	 analysis,	 further	 tools	 are	
needed.	 It	 is	 here	 that	 a	 governmentality	 perspective	 has	 much	 to	 offer	 scholarship	 on	 the	
preventive	state,	providing	a	textured	account	of	preventive	governance	and	informing	critique	
of	the	preventive	state	concept.	Whether	and	how	preventive	measures	are	new	or	different	in	
form	or	 operation	 raises	 important	 questions	 about	how	we	 govern	 and	 are	 governed,	 about	
selectivity	in	prevention	by	liberty	restraint,	and	where	the	limits	lie	of	state	action	to	prevent	
harm.		
	
The	preventive	state		
While	originally	justified	as	exceptional	and	temporary	measures	to	meet	an	exceptional	threat,	
the	commonalities	between	prevention	in	anti‐terror	law	and	preventive	measures	employed	in	
other	areas	of	Australian	law	warrant	further	consideration.	Dershowtiz,	for	example,	traces	the	
use	prevention	by	 liberty	restraint	of	persons	deemed	dangerous	 ‘to	 illustrate	a	more	general	
phenomenon,	namely,	 that	preemptive	actions	of	many	kinds	have	been	 far	more	common	 in	
practice	 than	 they	 appear	 in	 theory’	 (Dershowitz,	 2006:	 58).	 An	 investigation	 of	 preventive	
measures	in	Australia	may	reveal	that	prevention	and	pre‐emption	in	anti‐terror	law	form	part	
of	a	broader	pattern	of	preventive	governance	(Tulich,	2012).		
	
The	 rise	 of	 prevention	 (loosely	 defined	 as	 state	 interventions	 that	 target	 an	 identified	 threat	
before	it	eventuates)	and	pre‐emption	(broadly	describing	state	interventions	to	‘target	threats	
before	 they	 emerge’	 (McCulloch	 and	 Pickering,	 2010:	 15‐17))	 in	 anti‐terror	 law	 may	 be	
examined	 in	the	context	of	a	broader	transformation	of	governance	and	society,	 influenced	by	
an	increasing	preoccupation	with	risk,	uncertainty	and	(in)security	(Beck,	1992;	Ericson,	2007;	
Zedner	2009).	One	way	 in	which	 the	 fixation	on	 risk,	uncertainty	and	 insecurity	has	wrought	
change	 is	 in	 a	 shift	 in	 emphasis	 in	 governance	 from	a	 ‘reactive’	 or	 ‘punitive’	 state,	where	 the	
state	intervenes	after	harm	occurs,	to	‘the	preventive	state’	in	which	the	state	seeks	to	intervene	
before	harm	occurs	(Dershowitz,	2009;	Steiker,	1998).		
	
The	preventive	 state	 is	 a	useful	way	 to	 conceptualise	 the	 impetus	 for	prevention	 in	 domestic	
anti‐terror	law.	Steiker	first	coined	the	preventive	state	in	1998,	prior	to	the	so	called	‘war	on	
terror’,	 to	 describe	 the	 disparate	 collection	 of	 measures	 employed	 in	 the	 United	 States	 to	
‘prevent	or	prophylactically	deter	(as	opposed	to	investigate)	crime	and	to	incapacitate	or	treat	
(as	 opposed	 to	 punish)	 wrongdoers’	 (Steiker,	 1998:	 806).	 Following	 September	 11,	
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commentators	have	identified	prevention	in	anti‐terror	law	as	a	manifestation	of	the	preventive	
state,	where	the	state	seeks	to	prevent	or	pre‐empt	harm	by	targeting	those	deemed	‘dangerous’	
and	 restricting	 their	 liberty	 before	 they	 cause	 harm,	 such	 as	 by	 preventatively	 detaining	 an	
individual	 to	 forestall	 a	 terrorist	 attack	 (Ashworth	 2009;	 Ashworth	 and	 Zedner,	 2008;	 Janus	
2004,	2006;	Steiker	1998).		
	
In	invoking	the	preventive	state,	Steiker	identified	two	issues	that	are	of	continued	relevance	to	
Australia.	First,	any	attention	that	was	given	to	preventive	measures	was	limited	to	the	question	
of	 whether	 a	 measure	 amounted	 to	 prevention	 or	 punishment	 (Steiker,	 1998:	 776‐7).	 In	
Australia,	the	question	of	whether	a	measure	is	punitive	or	not	has,	for	good	reason,	garnered	a	
great	deal	of	commentary	and	analysis	by	the	courts,	as	this	distinction	has	implications	for	the	
constitutional	 validity	 of	 detention	 (Gordon,	 2012;	 McDonald,	 2007).	 Punitive	 detention,	 for	
example,	may	only	be	ordered	by	a	court,	 subsequent	 to	 the	adjudication	of	criminal	guilt,	by	
virtue	of	the	strict	separation	of	judicial	power	(Chu	Kheng	Lim	v	Minister	for	Immigration,	Local	
Government	and	Ethnic	Affairs	 (1992)	 176	 CLR	 1,	 per	 Brennan,	 Deane	 and	Dawson	 JJ	 at	 27).	
However,	 Steiker’s	 concern	 was	 that	 preoccupation	 with	 the	 preventive/punitive	 distinction	
obscured	 broader	 inquiry	 into	 the	 scope	 and	 limits	 of	 the	 preventive	 state.	 It	 also	 led,	 she	
argued,	 to	 the	 ‘mistaken	 impression’	 that	 if	 the	 state	was	not	punishing	but	preventing	 crime	
and	disorder,	its	actions	were	unobjectionable	(Steiker,	1998:	784).	
	
The	second	issue	Steiker	identified	was	that	the	limits	of	state	action	to	prevent	harm	ought	to	
be	articulated	and	enforced,	as	are	those	of	the	punitive	state.	The	scope	and	limits	of	the	state	
as	 punisher	 are	 well	 established	 and	 policed,	 yet	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 preventive	 state	 remain	
largely	 neglected	 (Steiker,	 1998:	 773‐4).	 Preventive	 measures	 were	 not	 being	 investigated	
cohesively	 but	 ‘treated	 as	 sui	 generic’,	 with	 ‘few	 connections	 …	 made	 between	 the	 main	
categories	 of	 preventive	 restraints,	 such	 as	 pre‐trial	 detention,	 civil	 commitment	 of	 the	
dangerous	 mentally	 ill’	 (Steiker,	 1998:	 778).	 In	 Australia,	 scant	 regard	 has	 been	 paid	 to	 the	
collection	 of	 preventive	 laws	 employed	 by	 governments,	 the	 connections	 and	 disconnections	
between	 them	 and	 the	 challenges	 to	 which	 they	 give	 rise.2	 Appreciating	 how	 preventive	
measures	are	distinct	and	similar	has	the	potential	to	inform	and	enhance	‘discussion	about	the	
appropriate	limits	to	be	placed	upon	the	preventive	state’	(Zedner,	2007b:	190).	The	preventive	
state	affords	one	way	in	which	attention	may	be	given	to	developing	a	more	cohesive	preventive	
jurisprudence	in	Australia	and	to	articulating	what	principles,	values	and	limits	attach	to	state	
action	that	seeks	to	prevent	future	harm	by	restricting	liberty	in	the	present	(Zedner,	2007b).	
	
The	 preventive	 state	 serves	 as	 an	 umbrella	 concept	 to	 describe	 and	 encompass	 state	 action	
which	seeks	to	anticipate	and	avert	or	minimise	harm;	 that	 is,	state	action	 in	 furtherance	of	a	
particular	objective	–	the	prevention	of	harm.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	the	preventive	state	is	
displacing	the	punitive	state	where	the	state	acts	in	furtherance	of	the	objective	of	punishment.	
Rather,	preventive	measures	are	increasingly	employed	by	governments	and	serve	to	broaden	
the	boundaries	of	 the	criminal	 justice	system	(Ashworth,	2009:	87‐8).	The	preventive	 state	 is	
deliberately	pitched	at	a	high	 ‘level	of	conceptual	generalization’	to	 facilitate	the	collation	and	
investigation	 of	 the	 array	 of	 preventive	 measures	 employed	 by	 governments	 (Steiker,	 1998:	
779‐80).	 Nonetheless,	 laws	 that	 fall	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	 preventive	 state	 may	 be	 said	 to	
share	two	features:	a	preventive	nature;	and	a	future	orientation	(Ashworth	and	Zedner,	2008).	
The	 first	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 purpose	 and	 effect	 of	 the	 law;	 the	 second	 to	 its	 predictive	
component.		
	
Characterising	a	law	as	preventive	is	a	difficult	task	that	goes	beyond	legislative	designation.	A	
legislative	 label	 of	 prevention	 does	 not,	 for	 example,	 automatically	 shield	 a	 law	 from	 being	
punitive	in	substance	or	effect,	or	from	attracting	a	punitive	sanction	(Tulich,	2012).	Prevention	
and	 punishment	 are	 neither	 easily	 distinguishable	 nor	 mutually	 exclusive.	 The	 task	 of	
sentencing	usefully	 illustrates	this,	combining	as	 it	does	preventive	and	punitive	purposes.	As	
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members	of	the	High	Court	stated	in	Veen	v	The	Queen	(No	2)	(1988)	164	CLR	465	at	476	(per	
Mason	CJ,	Brennan,	Dawson	and	Toohey	JJ):	
	
The	 purposes	 of	 criminal	 punishment	 are	 various:	 protection	 of	 society,	
deterrence	 of	 the	 offender	 and	 of	 others	 who	 might	 be	 tempted	 to	 offend,	
retribution	 and	 reform.	 The	 purposes	 overlap	 and	 none	 of	 them	 can	 be	
considered	in	isolation	from	the	others	when	determining	what	is	an	appropriate	
sentence	in	a	particular	case.		
	
Preparatory	offences	may	be	said	to	be	preventive	in	nature:	their	aim	is	to	prevent	a	terrorist	
act	by	interrupting	it,	even	though	they	also	constitute	substantive	offences	for	acts	taken	that	
are	preparatory	 to	 a	 terrorist	 act	 and	attract	 custodial	 sentences.	Whealy	 J	 in	his	 remarks	on	
sentence	in	R	v	Lodhi	[2006]	NSWSC	691,	which	related	to	three	preparatory	offences,	stated	at	
[51]:	
	
the	 legislation	under	which	these	offences	has	been	created	was	specifically	set	
up	 to	 intercept	and	prevent	a	 terrorist	act	at	a	very	early	or	preparatory	stage,	
long	before	it	would	be	likely	to	culminate	in	the	destruction	of	property	and	the	
death	of	 innocent	people.	The	very	purpose	of	the	 legislation	 is	 to	 interrupt	the	
preparatory	stages	leading	to	the	engagement	in	a	terrorist	act	so	as	to	frustrate	
its	ultimate	commission.	
	
Control	 orders	under	Division	104	of	 the	Criminal	Code	are	 similarly	preventive.	They	 enable	
restrictions,	prohibitions	and	obligations	to	be	placed	on	a	person	‘for	the	purpose	of	protecting	
the	public	 from	a	 terrorist	act’	 (s	104.1,	Criminal	Code).	Control	orders	are	predictive	and	are	
imposed	 to	 prevent	 future	 harm	 from	 occurring,	 albeit	 attracting	 a	 punitive	 sanction	 of	 a	
maximum	of	5	years	imprisonment	on	breach.	
	
A	 future	 orientation	 captures	 legislative	 attempts	 to	 govern	 the	 future	 by	 sanctioning	
intervention	 that	 preventively	 restrains	 an	 individual’s	 liberty	 in	 the	 present	 (Ashworth	 and	
Zedner,	 2008:	 21).	 ‘Future	 law,’	 (Ashworth	 and	 Zedner,	 2008:	 42)	 and	 ‘Future	 Governance’	
(Crawford,	2009:	819)	have	been	coined	to	describe	 these	efforts.	Future	governance	permits	
the	 state	 to	 intervene	 and	 restrict	 a	 person’s	 liberty	 to	 avert	 an	 anticipated	 future	 harm,	
enabling	 intervention	 at	 points	 in	 time	well	 before,	 and	well	 after,	 that	which	 is	 traditionally	
accepted	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Such	 intervention	 occurs	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 lower	
threshold	of	knowledge:	the	further	removed	intervention	is	from	the	harm	to	be	prevented,	the	
lower	the	threshold	of	knowledge	to	found	intervention.	
	
A	 future	 orientation	 also	 gives	 rise	 to	 new	modes	 of	 governance,	 such	 as	 ‘the	 bid	 to	 control	
future	behaviour	through	strategies	of	self‐governance’	(Ashworth	and	Zedner,	2008:	41).	This	
is	what	Crawford	terms	‘contractual	governance’	or	‘regulated	self‐regulation’,	which	he	argues	
represents	 ‘a	 shift	 in	 regulatory	 style’	 and	 the	 mode	 by	 which	 individuals	 are	 increasingly	
governed	 (Crawford,	 2003:	 487).	 By	 contractual	 governance,	 the	 state	 seeks	 to	 control	 the	
future	 behaviour	 of	 an	 individual	 through	 a	 ‘contractual	 arrangement’.	 Many	 Australian	
examples	of	contractual	governance	are	also	civil/criminal	hybrid	orders;	that	is,	orders	that	are	
civil	 in	 nature,	 yet	 attract	 criminal	 penalty	 on	 breach.	 This	 is	 true	 of	 anti‐terror	 and	 serious	
organised	 crime	 control	 orders,	 and	 extended	 supervision	 orders	 in	 respect	 of	 serious	 sex	
offenders.	These	orders	are	said	to	be	self‐regulating	and	induce	self‐policing:	they	work	on	the	
assumption	that	an	individual	subject	to	an	order	will,	acting	in	rational	self	interest,	voluntarily	
comply	with	the	order	so	as	avoid	the	consequences	of	breach	(Ashworth	and	Zedner,	2008).		
	
The	introduction	of	preparatory	offences	in	Division	101	of	the	Criminal	Code	provides	a	good	
example	 of	 the	 future	 orientation	 and	 preventive	 push	 in	 domestic	 anti‐terror	 law.	 The	
preparatory	offences	establish	criminal	responsibility	‘at	an	earlier	stage	than	is	usually	the	case	
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for	other	kinds	of	criminal	conduct;,	for	example,	well	before	an	agreement	has	been	reached	for	
a	conspiracy	charge’	and	well	before	the	person	has	‘decided	precisely	what	he	or	she	intends	to	
do’	(Lodhi	v	R	[2006]	NSWCCA	121	at	[66]	per	Spigelman	CJ).	The	introduction	of	preparatory	
offences	 has	 enabled	 criminal	 liability	 to	 arise	 at	 points	 in	 time	 prior	 to	 inchoate	 liability,	
extending	the	reach	of	the	criminal	law.		
	
In	 March	 2002,	 the	 Howard	 government	 introduced	 the	 Security	 Legislation	 Amendment	
(Terrorism)	Bill	2002	[No.	2]	(Cth)	into	parliament	to	create	the	offence	of	engaging	in	an	act	of	
terrorism	as	well	 as	 four	preparatory	offences.	 This	Bill	 received	Royal	Assent	 in	 July	 of	 that	
year.	The	substantive	offence	of	engaging	in	an	act	of	terrorism	attracts	a	maximum	penalty	of	
life	 imprisonment	 (Criminal	Code,	 s101.1).	 To	 this	 offence	 attaches	 inchoate	 liability,	 notably	
attempt	 and	 conspiracy	 contained	 in	 ss	 11.1	 and	 11.5	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Code.	 While	 inchoate	
liability	is	not	uncontroversial,	in	that	it	enables	the	state	to	intervene	to	prosecute	and	punish	a	
person	who	intends	to	cause	harm	but	who	has	not	yet	done	so	(MacDonald	and	Williams,	2007:	
33‐35;	McSherry,	 2009),	 it	 is	 at	 this	 point	 that	 the	 criminal	 law	 traditionally	marks	 criminal	
liability.		
	
Preparatory	 offences	 criminalise	 acts	 and	 associations	 that	 are	 further	 removed	 from	 the	
commission	of	a	 terrorist	act,	 and	 in	doing	so	create	pre‐inchoate	 liability	 (see	Ashworth	and	
Zedner	2011:	285‐6;	Tulich,	2012).	The	first	three	species	of	preparatory	offence	are	similarly	
constructed.	A	person	commits	an	offence	if	he	or	she	‘provides	or	receives	training’,	 ‘posses	a	
thing’	 or	 ‘collects	 or	 makes	 a	 document’	 that	 is	 ‘connected	 with	 the	 preparation	 for,	 the	
engagement	of	a	person	in,	assistance	in	a	terrorist	act’	and	the	person	knows	of,	or	‘is	reckless	
as	to	the	existence	of’,	the	connection	(ss101.2,	101.4‐5,	Criminal	Code).	Where	knowledge	of	the	
connection	 is	 established,	 the	 maximum	 penalty	 for	 involvement	 in	 training	 is	 25	 years	
imprisonment,	with	the	other	two	offences	attracting	a	maximum	of	15	years	imprisonment.	If	
recklessness	 as	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 connection	 is	 established,	 the	 maximum	 penalty	 for	
involvement	 in	 training	 is	 15	 years	 imprisonment,	with	 10	 years	 attaching	 to	 the	 offences	 of	
possessing	a	thing	and	collecting	or	making	a	document.		
	
The	forth	preparatory	offence,	which	captures	the	widest	conduct,	attracts	a	maximum	penalty	
of	life	imprisonment.	A	person	commits	an	offence	if	the	he	or	she	‘does	any	act	in	preparation	
for,	 or	 planning,	 a	 terrorist	 act’	 (s101.6,	 Criminal	 Code).	 In	 respect	 to	 all	 of	 the	 preparatory	
offences,	 an	 offence	 is	 committed	 even	 if	 a	 ‘terrorist	 act	 does	 not	 occur’;	 if	 the	
training/thing/document	is	not	connected	with,	or	the	person’s	act	is	not	done,	‘in	preparation	
for,	 the	 engagement	 of	 a	 person	 in,	 or	 assistance	 in	 a	 specific	 terrorist	 act’;	 or	 the	
training/thing/document/the	person’s	act	 ‘is	connected	with	preparation	 for,	 the	engagement	
of	a	person	in,	or	assistance	 in	a	more	than	one	terrorist	act’	 (ss101.2(3),	101.4	(3),	101.5(3),	
101.6(2),	Criminal	Code).		
	
The	 breadth	 of	 the	 preparatory	 offences	 is	 compounded	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 to	 each	 of	 the	 four	
offences	 attaches	 inchoate	 liability.	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 an	 offence	 to	 attempt	 to	 do	 an	 act	 in	
preparation	for	a	terrorist	act	pursuant	to	ss11.1	and	101.6	of	 the	Criminal	Code.	This	creates	
something	 in	 the	 order	 of	 pre‐pre‐inchoate	 liability,	 further	 elongating	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	
criminal	 law	(Tulich,	2012).	The	 inchoate	offence	of	attempt,	as	noted,	 is	 ‘punishable	as	 if	 the	
offence	 attempted	had	been	 committed’	 (s11.1,	Criminal	Code).	The	maximum	penalty	 for	 the	
offence	 of	 attempting	 to	 do	 an	 act	 in	 preparation	 for	 a	 terrorist	 act	 is,	 therefore,	 life	
imprisonment	(101.6,	Criminal	Code.).		
	
The	 extension	 of	 criminal	 liability	 to	 preparatory	 offences	 and	 pre‐pre‐inchoate	 liability	
involves	the	criminalisation	of	acts	taken	well	before,	and	further	removed	from	harm,	than	that	
which	is	traditionally	accepted	in	Australian	criminal	law	while	subjecting	an	individual	to	the	
severest	 range	 of	 penalties	 available	 under	 the	Criminal	Code.	MacDonald	 and	Williams	 point	
out	that	these	offences	thereby	‘render	individuals	liable	to	very	serious	penalties	even	before	
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there	is	clear	criminal	intent’	(MacDonald	and	Williams,	2007:	34).	The	creation	of	preparatory	
offences	is	not	a	common	occurrence;	as	Spigelman	CJ	noted	in	Lodhi	v	R	at	[66]:	
	
Preparatory	acts	are	not	often	made	into	criminal	offences.	The	particular	nature	
of	 terrorism	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 special,	 and	 in	 many	 ways	 unique,	 legislative	
regime.		
	
Just	how	unique	or	different	prevention	in	anti‐terror	law	is	to	that	employed	in	other	areas	of	
Australian	law,	and	whether	relevant	similarities	exist,	warrants	further	consideration.	Such	an	
inquiry	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 critically	 assess	 whether	 prevention	 in	 anti‐terror	 law	 is	
exceptional,	or	as	exceptional	as	claimed.	However,	there	is	only	so	much	work	the	preventive	
state,	as	a	general	conceptual	framework,	can	do.	It	does	not,	for	example,	provide	the	analytical	
tools	 to	 investigate	and	critique	action	 taken	within	 it,	or	 the	effects	produced	(Tulich,	2012).	
The	 governmentality	 perspective	 has	 much	 to	 offer	 scholarship	 of	 the	 preventive	 state;	 it	
provides	tools	to	analyse	law	and	governance	of	the	preventive	state	in	a	textured	and	reflective	
manner,	exposing	the	preventive	state	itself	to	critical	treatment.	
	
An	analytical	perspective:	Governmentality		
The	 governmentality	perspective	derives	 from	Foucault’s	 lectures	 at	 the	Collège	de	 France	 in	
1978	(Foucault,	2007).	For	the	purpose	of	this	paper,	the	relevant	meaning	of	‘governmentality’	
is	an	inquiry	into	the	art	of	government,	into	the	craft	of	governing:	the	practices,	institutions,	
procedures	and	programmes	through	which	we	govern	and	are	governed	(Dean,	2010:	27‐28;	
Foucault,	2007:	108)).	This	form	of	analysis,	then,	entails	identifying	(Rose	et	al.,	2006:	83):	
	
these	different	styles	of	thought,	their	conditions	of	formation,	the	principles	and	
knowledges	 that	 they	 borrow	 from	 and	 generate,	 the	 practices	 they	 consist	 of,	
how	 they	 are	 carried	 out,	 their	 contestations	 and	 alliances	 with	 other	 arts	 of	
governing.		
	
This	 governmentality	 approach	 stems	 from	 Anglophonic	 governmentality	 scholarship.	 This	
scholarship	is	diverse	and	varied,	yet	shares	an	analytical	perspective.	Bröckling,	Krasmann	and	
Lemke	describe	this	as	a	‘research	perspective	in	the	literal	sense:	an	angle	of	view,	a	manner	of	
looking,	a	specific	orientation’	into	the	art	of	government,	rather	than	a	prescribed	and	distinct	
methodological	‘inventory’	(Bröckling	et	al.,	2011:	11).	
	
It	is	this	analytical	perspective	that	a	governmentality	lens	can	contribute	to	scholarship	on	the	
preventive	 state:	 it	 provides	 a	 way	 of	 viewing	 the	 practices	 and	 institutions	 of	 government	
orientated	 to	 the	 specific	 ideal	 of	 harm	 prevention.	 A	more	 textured	 account	may	 be	 had	 by	
scrutiny	of	mechanisms	of	power	–	law	being	one	way	in	which	power	is	exercised	–	and	giving	
attention	 to	 how	 we	 are	 governed;	 by	 unpacking	 the	 rationality	 or	 logic	 influencing	 future	
governance	in	different	settings;	and	by	examining	the	practices	that	direct	conduct	as	part	of	
this	rationality.		
	
Many	commentators	have	observed	a	new	precautionary	logic	influencing	thought	and	action	of	
individuals	and	governments	in	the	21st	century	(see,	for	instance,	Ericson,	2007;	Zedner,	2009).	
Precaution	is	a	product	of	 the	 increasing	preoccupation	with	uncertainty	and	aversion	of	risk.	
Aradau	and	van	Munster	(2007:	91)	argue	that:		
	
What	 is	 new	 is	not	 so	much	 the	 advent	 of	 a	 risk	 society	 as	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	
‘precautionary’	 element	 that	 has	 given	 birth	 to	 new	 configurations	 of	 risk	 that	
require	that	the	catastrophic	prospects	of	the	future	be	avoided	at	all	costs.	
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The	precautionary	principle,	originally	arising	in	environmental	regulation	in	respect	to	harms	
of	potentially	catastrophic	and	irreversible	impact,	is	increasingly	discussed	as	a	regulatory	tool	
in	 international	 law,	 risk	 regulation	 and	 security	 studies	 (Fisher,	 2001:	 315;	 McSherry	 and	
Keyzer,	 2009;	 Stern	 and	Wiener,	 2006;	 Sunstein,	 2005:	 16).	 The	 precautionary	 principle	 has	
been	 the	 subject	 of	 much	 commentary,	 yet	 its	 precise	 content	 is	 not	 settled	 (Ewald,	 1999;	
Sunstein,	 2005).	 A	 precautionary	 approach	 promotes	 action	 by	 regulators	 ‘to	 protect	 against	
potential	harms,	even	if	the	causal	chains	are	unclear’	and	uncertainty	exists	as	to	whether	the	
harms	 will	 ‘come	 to	 fruition’	 (Sunstein,	 2005:	 4).	 In	 the	 anti‐terror	 context	 the	 harm	
requirement	 has	 been	 lowered:	 state	 intervention	 now	 occurs	 where	 harms	 are	 of	 lesser	
severity	than	catastrophic	and	irreversible	(Zedner,	2009:	84).		
	
A	 precautionary	 element	 is	 evident	 in	 law	 and	 policy	 of	 the	 Australian	 government,	 albeit	
without	 the	 government	 directly	 advocating	 the	 precautionary	 principle	 against	 terrorism	
(Bronitt,	2008:	79).	For	example,	Senator	Chris	Ellison,	 then	Minister	 for	 Justice	and	Customs,	
justified	preparatory	offences	to	the	Senate	as	follows:	
	
In	 the	 security	 environment	 that	 we	 are	 dealing	 with,	 you	 may	 well	 have	 a	
situation	where	a	number	of	people	are	doing	things	but	you	do	not	yet	have	the	
information	which	would	 lead	 you	 to	 identify	 a	 particular	 act	 ...	When	 you	 are	
dealing	with	security,	you	have	to	keep	an	eye	on	prevention	of	the	act	 itself	as	
well	as	bringing	those	who	are	guilty	of	the	act	to	justice	(Australia,	Senate	2005:	
43	cited	in	MacDonald	and	Williams,	2007:	34).	
	
Precaution	may	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 rationale	 that	 drives	 law	 and	 policy	 of	 the	 preventive	
state.	 The	 practices	 that	 direct	 conduct	 in	 furtherance	 of	 this	 precautionary	 logic	 are	 seen	
through	 the	 techniques	 of	 prevention	 and	 pre‐emption.	While	 sharing	 a	 precautionary	 logic,	
prevention	 and	 pre‐emption	 are	 conceptually	 distinct	 and	may	 be	 distinguished	 according	 to	
the	point	at	which	they	permit	intervention	by	the	state,	and	the	requisite	knowledge	threshold	
to	 found	 intervention.	 By	 investigating	 these	 two	 techniques	 we	 can	 start	 viewing,	 and	
importantly	comparing,	how	law	operates	inside	the	preventive	state.	
	
Massumi’s	 analysis	 of	 prevention	 and	 pre‐emption	 furnishes	 key	 insights	 for	 distinguishing	
between	 these	 concepts	 in	 domestic	 legislation	 (Massumi,	 2007;	 Tulich,	 2012).	 Following	
September	 11,	 the	 terms	 employed	 to	 describe	 anticipatory	 action	 taken	 by	 governments	 –	
prevention,	pre‐emption	and	precaution	–	have	been	extensively	and	 inconsistently	employed	
(Tulich,	2012).	Valverde	expressed	it	well	when	she	reported	that	 ‘[t]he	term	‘security’	is	now	
doing	a	great	deal	of	work	in	a	wide	variety	of	fields’	(Valverde,	2011:	4).	Similarly,	prevention,	
pre‐emption	and	precaution	are	doing	a	 great	deal	of	work	 in	a	 great	many	disciplines.	Their	
inconsistent	usage	reflects	the	different	perspectives	of	those	in	government	and	academia,	and	
the	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 migrating	 terminology	 between	 disciplines	 and	 jurisdictions.	
This	has	hindered	meaningful	analysis	of	domestic	legal	responses	to	terror	(Tulich,	2012).		
	
Massumi’s	account	provides	a	comprehensive	examination	of	prevention	and	pre‐emption.	For	
Massumi,	prevention	and	pre‐emption	both	operate	 ‘in	the	present	on	a	future	threat’	and	are	
orientated	towards	neutralising	that	threat	(Massumi,	2007:	para.	13).	However,	in	order	to	do	
so	they	rely	upon	distinct	knowledge	premises.	Prevention	achieves	neutralisation	of	threat	by	
acquiring	 the	capability	 to	prevent	a	 threat.	As	such,	underlying	prevention	 is	 the	assumption	
that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 empirically	 assess	 a	 threat,	 identify	 its	 causes	 and	 adopt	 a	 method	 to	
neutralise	it	(para.	5).	The	epistemological	premise	of	prevention	is	that	the	world	is	objectively	
knowable;	 uncertainty	 arises	 from	 a	 ‘lack	 of	 information’	 and	 the	 trajectory	 of	 an	 event	 is	
predictable	and	linear	(para.	5).	Pre‐emption,	by	contrast,	operates	in	conditions	of	uncertainty.	
Unlike	prevention	where	uncertainty	results	from	a	deficiency	of	information,	for	pre‐emption,	
uncertainty	arises	because	the	threat	has	not	emerged.	As	the	risk	of	harm	has	not	arisen,	the	
threat	 is	 indeterminate;	 neither	 the	 threat	 nor	 the	 enemy	 can	 be	 specified	 (para.	 13).	
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Uncertainty	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 threat	 is	 insurmountable;	 it	 cannot	 be	 overcome	 by	 the	
provision	of	information,	and	gives	rise	to	potential	politics	and	reliance	upon	the	subjunctive:	
‘could	have’,	‘if’,	‘would	have’	(para.	17).		
	
Massumi’s	 distinction	 between	 prevention	 and	 pre‐emption	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 timing	 of	
intervention	and	the	knowledge	threshold	provides	a	basis	upon	which	to	distinguish	between	
preventive	 measures	 in	 domestic	 law	 (Tulich,	 2012).	 Pre‐emption	 and	 prevention	 are	
comprised	 of	 prediction	 and	 intervention.	 Prediction	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 status	 of	
knowledge,	 and	 intervention	 to	 how	 strategies	 of	 prevention	 and	 pre‐emption	 are	 conceived	
(Freeman,	 1992).	 Pre‐emption	 rests	 on	 the	knowledge	premise	 that	 the	 future	 is	 incalculable	
and	is	organised	around	uncertainty.	Intervention	occurs	when	a	threat	of	harm	is	emergent	but	
not	 determinate.	 This	 translates,	 for	 example,	 into	 intervention	 not	 only	 prior	 to	 harm	
occurring,	or	the	commission	of	a	criminal	act,	but	also	prior	to	the	formation	of	clear	criminal	
intent	 to	 commit	 the	 harm	 sought	 to	 be	 avoided	 (Ericson,	 2007;	 MacDonald	 and	 Williams,	
2007).	Intervention	occurs	ahead	of	the	risk	of	harm	developing.		
	
Because	pre‐emption	permits	interventions	that	are	so	far	removed	from	the	anticipated	harm,	
the	 knowledge	 upon	which	 intervention	 is	 based	 is	 lower.	 Pursuant	 to	Australia’s	 anti‐terror	
control	 order	 regime,	 for	 example,	 a	 senior	 AFP	 officer,	 in	 obtaining	 consent	 of	 the	 Attorney	
General	 to	request	an	 interim	control	order,	must	either	consider	on	reasonable	grounds	 that	
the	 order	 would	 substantially	 assist	 in	 preventing	 a	 terrorist	 act	 or	 suspect	 on	 reasonable	
ground	that	the	person	has	provided	or	received	training	from	a	listed	terrorist	organisation	(s	
104.2,	Criminal	Code).	 The	 first	 criterion	 enables	 pre‐emption,	 facilitating	 intervention	 on	 the	
basis	 of	 ‘an	 estimate	 of	 some	 future	 act,	 not	 necessary	 one	 to	 be	 committed	 by	 the	 person	
subject	to	the	proposed	order’	(Thomas	v	Mowbray	[2007]	233	CLR	307	per	Kirby	J	at	[357]).	In	
order	 that	an	 interim	control	order	be	 issued	on	 the	basis	of	 this	predictive	criterion,	 a	 court	
must	be	satisfied	to	the	civil	standard	of	the	balance	of	probabilities	that	a	control	order	would	
‘substantially	 assist	 in	 preventing	 a	 terrorist	 act’	 and	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 order	 are	 ‘reasonably	
necessary,	 and	 reasonably	appropriate	 and	adapted’	 to	 ‘protecting	 the	public	 from	a	 terrorist	
act’	 (s104.4,	 Criminal	 Code).	 Being	 so	 removed	 from	 the	 harm	 to	 be	 averted,	 pre‐emption	
licenses	action	on	the	basis	of	intelligence	and	threat	assessments.		
	
Prevention	provides	a	framework	for	a	decision	maker	to	assess	the	likelihood	and	degree	of	a	
threat	prior	to	acting	(Zedner,	2008:	46).	Action	is	taken	on	the	basis	of	a	risk	prediction;	risk	
provides	the	logic	or	justification	for	intervention	(Zedner,	2008).	Prevention,	as	noted,	assumes	
it	is	possible	to	assess	with	accuracy	and	objectivity	the	risk	an	individual	poses.	In	this	way,	it	
presumes	that	 the	 future	 is	calculable,	a	premise	underlying	risk	assessments	(Zedner,	2008).	
Being	 temporally	 closer	 to	 the	 risk	of	 harm	 sought	 to	be	 averted,	 intervention	occurs	upon	a	
higher	threshold	of	knowledge.		
	
Applying	 this	 framework	 to	 the	 example	 of	 the	 preparatory	 terrorism	 offences	 reveals	 an	
appreciable	 emphasis	 on	 pre‐emption	 in	 domestic	 anti‐terror	 law	 (Tulich,	 2012).	 The	
substantive	 offence	 of	 engaging	 in	 a	 terrorist	 act,	 under	 s101.1	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Code,	 is	 an	
example	of	 the	 ‘punitive	 state’	 and	 a	 ‘post‐crime’	 intervention.	Here	 state	 intervention	 occurs	
after	 the	 commission	 of	 a	 terrorist	 act,	 after	 criminal	 intention	 is	 formed	 to	 commit	 the	
substantive	 offence.	 The	 inchoate	 offence	 of	 attempting	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 terrorist	 attack	 is	 an	
example	of	prevention.	The	state	intervenes	prior	to	the	commission	of	the	substantive	offence,	
but	after	there	have	been	‘acts	more	than	merely	preparatory’	to	the	offence	and	the	formation	
of	 the	 requisite	 intention	 to	 commit	 the	 substantive	 offence	 (s11,	Criminal	Code).	 This	 is	 the	
threshold	at	which	the	risk	or	likelihood	of	the	offence	justifies	intervention.	
	
The	preparatory	offence	of	doing	an	act	in	preparation	for	a	terrorist	attack,	pursuant	to	s106.1	
of	the	Criminal	Code,	is	an	example	of	pre‐emption.	The	state	intervenes	before	the	crime	occurs	
and	prior	to	the	commission	of	‘acts	more	than	merely	preparatory’	to	the	offence.	This	risk	of	
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harm	–	the	terrorist	act	–	has	not	yet	arisen;	the	threat	of	harm	is	emergent	but	not	determinate.	
As	Whealy	J	stated	R	v	Lodhi	(2005)	199	FLR	236,	at	246:	
	
an	offence	will	have	been	committed	by	a	person	acting	in	a	preliminary	way	in	
preparation	for	a	terrorist	act	even	where	no	decision	has	been	made	finally	as	to	
the	ultimate	target.	
	
Inchoate	 liability	 attached	 to	 the	 preparatory	 offences	 provides	 further	 examples	 of	 pre‐
emption,	enabling	intervention	to	occur	prior	to	the	commission	of	a	preparatory	offence.		
	
From	this	starting	point,	analysis	may	be	had	of	the	various	forms	of	knowledge	relied	upon	and	
the	 effects	 produced	 by	 pre‐emption	 and	 prevention	 in	 different	 settings.	 How,	 for	 example,	
does	 the	 increasing	 reliance	 upon	 national	 security	 intelligence	 as	 secret	 evidence	 in	 court	
proceedings	 –	 disclosure	 of	which	 is	 not	made	 to	 the	 individual	 subject	 to	 the	 proceedings	 –	
impact	upon	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 executive?	 It	may	 also	 generate	
inquiry	into	identity	and	how	different	forms	of	knowledge	define	those	subject	to	preventive	or	
pre‐emptive	practices	(Dean,	2010:	32).	These	inquiries	may	inform	articulation	of	the	limits	of	
preventive	action	by	making	visible	the	operation	of	preventive	laws	and	exposing	dissonance	
between	how	preventive	laws	are	conceived	and	operate.		
	
Governmentality	scholarship	may	also	inform	fruitful	critique	of	the	preventive	state	itself	and	
the	 scale	 of	 analysis	 it	 employs.	 Whilst	 Steiker	 adopted	 the	 term	 ‘state’	 in	 conjunction	 with	
‘preventive’	to	describe	‘any	sovereign	governmental	power’,	as	opposed	to	state	governments	
in	a	federal	system	(Steiker,	1998:	773,	n.	19),	critical	attention	has	not	focused	on	the	role	of	
the	 state	 in	 this	 analysis	 or	 the	 broader	 utility	 of	 the	 scale	 of	 analysis	 adopted.	 A	
governmentality	 lens,	 for	 example,	 may	 inform	 critique	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 useful	 category	 of	
analysis	 (Dean,	 2010:	 33‐37).	 Scaling	 down	 the	 analysis	 to	 a	 micro‐analytical	 approach	 may	
better	 serve	 to	 expose	 the	 reality	 and	 operation	 of	 preventive	 governance.	 It	 may	 draw	
attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 what	 is	 being	 described	 signifies	 a	 mode	 of	 governance,	 ‘future	
governance’	 (Crawford,	 2009:	 819)	 or	 ‘preventive	 governance’,	 elements	 of	 which	 may	 be	
present	in	a	range	of	governmental	practices.		
	
Implications	and	conclusion		
This	paper	has	sought	to	briefly	explore	implications	of	the	rise	of	prevention	and	pre‐emption	
as	part	of	Australia’s	anti‐terrorism	 framework.	The	conceptual	model	of	 the	preventive	state	
provides	 one	 mechanism	 through	 which	 to	 begin	 to	 appreciate	 these	 broader	 implications,	
focusing	 as	 it	 does	 attention	 on	 the	 diverse	 collection	 of	 preventive	 measures	 employed	 by	
governments.	 However,	 the	 preventive	 state	 has	 limitations:	 engaging	 a	 governmentality	
perspective	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 make	 visible	 prevention	 and	 pre‐emption	 in	 law	 and	
governance,	 and	 inform	 critique	 of	 the	 preventive	 state	 itself.	 Drawing	 connections	 and	
discontinuities	 between	 preventive	 measures	 is	 a	 critical	 step	 in	 engendering	 a	 broader	
preventive	 jurisprudence,	 through	which	 the	 scope	 and	 limits	 of	 the	preventive	 state	may	be	
considered	and	articulated.		
	
This	paper	provides	but	a	brief	overview	of	one	way	to	begin	 to	conceptualise	 the	preventive	
push	in	anti‐terror	law	and	draw	connections	between	the	diverse	set	of	preventive	measures	
that	exist	in	Australia.	The	scale	and	pace	of	the	enactment	of	anti‐terror	laws	and	the	impact	of	
these	measures	on	our	legal	system	has	to	date	garnered	much	attention,	illustrating	how	anti‐
terror	 laws	 have	 realigned	 our	 legal	 system	 ‘through	 the	 extensive	 powers	 they	 grant	 to	
government	and	 their	 impact	on	basic	 freedoms’	 (Lynch	and	Williams,	2006:	85‐6).	 Yet	 these	
measures	may	not	be	as	unique,	exceptional	or	isolated	as	heralded	on	enactment.	Examples	of	
future	governance	and	prevention	by	 liberty	 restraint	abound	 for	post‐sentence	 interventions	
in	relation	 to	serious	 sex	offenders,	 and	 involuntary	detention	of	persons	with	mental	 illness.	
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The	modelling	of	anti‐terror	 laws	 in	state	governmental	responses	 to	organised	crime	 further	
suggests	 the	 exceptionality	 of	 anti‐terror	 laws	 warrants	 enhanced	 scrutiny	 (Appleby	 and	
Williams,	2010;	Lynch,	2009;	McGarrity	and	Williams,	2010).		
	
An	additional	justification	for	adopting	and	pursuing	the	preventive	state	model	is	that	drawing	
connections	between	the	diverse	set	of	preventive	measures	may	avoid	dangers	discovered	in	
one	measure	being	 blindly	 reproduced	 in	 another	 (Zedner,	 2007b:	 189).	 It	may	 also	 uncover	
where	anti‐terror	laws	differ	 from	other	preventive	practices,	giving	rise	to	broader	questions	
as	 to	 proportionality	 between	 preventive	 measures	 and	 selectivity	 in	 who	 is	 the	 subject	 of	
preventive	 interventions.	 For	 example,	 in	 contrast	 to	 serious	 sex	 offender	 orders	 which	 are	
imposed	post	 sentence,	 anti‐terror	 control	orders	may	be	 imposed	 in	 the	absence	of	 criminal	
charge	or	adjudication	of	guilt	(Lynch,	2009).	Questions	may	properly	be	raised	about	why	this	
is	so,	and	where	acceptable	limits	of	state	action	to	prevent	harm	lie.		
	
Similarly,	 the	 extension	 of	 criminal	 liability	 to	 preparatory	 offences	 and	 by	 hybrid	
civil/criminal	 orders	 highlights	 the	 need	 to	 scrutinise	 the	 ambit	 of	 preventive	 practices.	
Preparatory	 offences,	 as	 noted,	 enable	 an	 individual	 to	 be	 subjected	 to	 the	 severest	
penalties	 available	 under	 the	 Criminal	 Code	 for	 acts	 taken	 at	 points	 in	 time	 prior	 to	 the	
enlivening	of	 inchoate	liability.	This	liability	thus	arises	prior	to	the	formation	of	intent	to	
commit	 the	 substantive	 offence,	 and	 prior	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 harm.	 Control	 orders,	 by	 their	
hybrid	civil/criminal	design,	enable	restrictions	 to	be	 imposed	upon	an	individual’s	liberty,	
such	 as	 electronic	 tagging,	 whilst	 ‘side‐stepping’	 the	 enhanced	 procedural	 protections	 that	
attach	to	the	criminal	justice	system	(Zedner,	2007c).	Ericson	put	it	well	when	he	wrote:	
	
Precautionary	logic	leads	to	criminalization	through	counter‐law	...	New	laws	are	
enacted	 and	 new	 uses	 of	 existing	 law	 are	 invented	 to	 erode	 or	 eliminate	
traditional	principles,	 standards,	and	procedures	of	 criminal	 law	 that	get	 in	 the	
way	of	pre‐empting	imagined	sources	of	harm.	(Ericson,	2009:	24)	
	
Whether	 prevention	 and	 pre‐emption	 are	 possible	without	 corroding	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	
criminal	justice	system	remains	a	pertinent	issue.		
	
Of	 further	 concern	 is	 how	prevention	and	pre‐emption	may	 compound	exclusion	 through	 the	
criminal	 justice	 system,	 as	 these	 measures	 predominantly	 affect	 marginalised	 and	 excluded	
members	 of	 society,	 such	 as	 the	mentally	 ill,	 serious	 sex	 offenders,	 and	 terrorist	 suspects.	 In	
Australia,	 37	 persons	 have	 been	 charged	 with	 terrorism	 related	 offences,	 of	 which	 the	
overwhelming	majority	have	been	Muslim	men,	and	all	but	one	of	the	‘proscribed’	terrorist	
organisations	 under	 Division	 104	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Code	 have	 been	 Muslim	 groups	
(McGarrity,	2010:	117;	Attorney‐General	Hon.	Robert	McClelland	MP,	2011).	Moreover,	the	
civil	liberties	concerns	raised	by	commentators	as	to	the	dangers	of	blindness	to	the	limits	
of	 the	 preventive	 state	 (Ashworth	 and	 Zedner,	 2008;	 Dershowitz,	 2009;	 Zedner,	 2007a,	
2007b,	 2007c,	 2008)	 are	 amplified	 in	 the	 Australian	 context,	 where	 reliance	 cannot	 be	
placed	on	a	federal	bill	of	rights	(Lynch	and	Williams,	2006;	Williams,	2011).		
	
The	rapid	development	of	Australia’s	preventive	anti‐terror	regime	raises	important	questions	
about	 how	 we	 govern	 and	 are	 governed,	 and	 how	 prevention	 in	 anti‐terror	 law	 should	 be	
understood	 within	 the	 Australian	 legal	 system	 (Tulich,	 2012).	 It	 forces	 consideration	 of	 the	
acceptable	 limits	 of	 state	 action	 to	 prevent	 harm	 and	 how	 unprecedented	 and	 exceptional	
preventive	 anti‐terror	 laws	 in	 fact	 are.	 Exploring	 continuities	 and	 distinctions	 between	
prevention	and	pre‐emption	 in	anti‐terror	 law	and	that	employed	in	other	areas	of	Australian	
law	as	part	of	a	broader	shift	in	emphasis	in	governance	has	the	potential	to	raise	new	questions	
about	proportionality	and	selectivity	in	preventive	practices,	as	well	as	the	rapid	development	
of	Australia’s	preventive	anti‐terror	regime	and	the	modelling	of	its	innovations	in	other	areas	
of	law.		
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1		 Supported	 by	 the	 Australian	 Research	 Council	 Laureate	 Fellowship	 Project	 ‘Anti‐Terror	 Laws	 and	 the	
Democractic	 Challenge’.	 A	 version	 of	 this	 paper	 was	 presented	 at	 the	 Crime,	 Justice	 and	 Social	 Democracy	
conference	at	Queensland	University	of	Technology,	28	September	2011.	I	thank	the	conference	organisers,	Kerry	
Carrington	and	Juan	Tauri,	and	participants.	I	am	grateful	to	Fergal	Davis	and	George	Williams	for	their	comments	
on	an	earlier	draft	of	the	presentation.	All	errors	of	course	remain	my	own.		
2		 Although	 notable	 efforts	 have	 been	 made:	 see	 Meyerson	 D	 (2009)	 Risks,	 rights,	 statistics	 and	 compulsory	
measures.	Sydney	Law	Review	31:	507‐535.	
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